— Back to Blog

The Billion Barrels the Oil Market Hasn’t Priced

The Billion Barrels the Oil Market Hasn’t Priced

When the Strait of Hormuz closed, Adam Rozencwajg’s team built a detailed model of the global oil supply chain. It tracked production, storage, vessel movements, transit times, and the flow of oil through the strait to downstream markets.

After all that complexity, the model produced a simple result: remove a billion barrels upstream and the market eventually ends up with a billion fewer barrels downstream. The exact timing may be uncertain, but the missing supply cannot simply disappear.

The world’s most important oil transit chokepoint had been partly closed for around 100 days, preventing an estimated one to one-and-a-half billion barrels from reaching the market. But still, prices have largely returned to where they started.

Adam explains that the market has not yet absorbed the full impact. Oil takes time to move from the wellhead through ships, storage tanks, refineries, and distribution. Investors may be interpreting the delay as evidence that the disruption was not severe when its effects are still moving through the system.

A disruption does not appear in inventory data immediately. Once a barrel is produced, it still has to reach a vessel, travel for several weeks, enter storage, pass through a refinery and move into distribution. The full process can take 60 to 90 days. This means the numbers investors see today may reflect conditions from two months earlier.

Another reason is that the data itself arrives slowly. The United States publishes weekly inventory figures, although even those are affected by the physical delay. Most other countries report monthly through the IEA, with an additional reporting lag. This is why inventories barely moved during the first six to eight weeks after the strait closed. The missing oil had not yet worked its way through the system.

The effects are now becoming more visible. US inventories are falling sharply, and the available international data suggests that inventories are also declining elsewhere. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve has dropped to its lowest level since the 1980s, and nobody knows exactly how much more can be safely withdrawn from the underground salt caverns where it is stored.

Adam believes the same delay will now work in reverse. If the strait reopens and more vessels begin moving through it, inventories may continue falling because the market is still absorbing the earlier loss of supply. That could create a confusing period in which the headlines suggest conditions are returning to normal while stockpiles continue to decline.

The world is estimated to hold between 7 and 8 billion barrels of oil in storage. At first glance, that appears to provide a large cushion against a supply disruption. Adam’s argument, however, is that much of this oil is required to keep the system operating and cannot simply be released when needed. It is closer to working capital than emergency savings.

Around 2 billion barrels is pipeline fill, the oil that must remain inside pipelines at all times. Draining it would require taking the pipeline out of service. Another 1.7 billion barrels is continually moving across the world by ship. Reducing that amount would mean cutting seaborne trade, which would make shortages worse rather than provide relief.

There is also oil that cannot normally be withdrawn from storage tanks. The outlet is positioned above the bottom of the tank so that sediment does not enter the pipes, leaving roughly the bottom 10 percent inaccessible.

Once these operational barrels are excluded, Adam estimates that the system’s usable minimum is closer to 1 billion barrels.

If global inventory draws eventually approach 1 billion barrels, as his estimates suggest, the market could come dangerously close to those limits. The world may appear to have an 8 billion-barrel cushion, but the amount it can actually draw on is far smaller.

China created another complication in the oil data. Petroleum demand is not measured directly. It is usually estimated partly from refinery activity, because refinery runs are easier to track than the final consumption of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel.

When the Strait of Hormuz closed, China stopped exporting refined products and reduced the role of its refineries in supplying the global market. Standard demand models interpreted the lower refinery runs as a decline of 5 to 6 million barrels a day, similar to the collapse seen during COVID.

Adam questions whether that reflects genuine demand destruction. Airports remain crowded, flights are full, and vehicle use has not collapsed. In his view, consumers did not suddenly stop using fuel. Instead, Chinese refiners stepped back from the export market, forcing the rest of the world to draw more heavily on existing refined-product inventories.

Why China chose to idle export capacity is less certain. Adam suggests it may have been a strategic test: a way of showing how China could protect its domestic market if access to imported oil were disrupted, while leaving the rest of the world to deal with the resulting shortages.

Bearish positioning may help explain why the oil price has remained weak despite increasingly tight fundamentals. Investors entered the conflict broadly pessimistic, and the initial rally appears to have been driven largely by short covering. Once that pressure faded, selling resumed, supported by the belief that the oil market remains in a structural surplus.

But last year’s relatively stable inventories did not show the kind of build that a large surplus should have produced. Demand may therefore have been stronger, and the market more balanced, than the prevailing narrative suggested. With inventories now already low and continuing to fall, that distinction matters.

The bearish price creates an uncomfortable question: can the physical fundamentals really be this tight while the market trades as though supply is abundant? One explanation is that some unseen source of supply or genuine demand destruction is balancing the system. The other possibility, and the one Adam believes the market is overlooking, is that price may simply be wrong for now.

The absence of a visible shortage today may not mean the supply shock has disappeared. It may simply mean that its full impact has not yet reached the reported numbers.

There is still a clear test for this view. The effects have taken longer to appear than expected, and if the next three or four months pass without a meaningful impact on inventories or the wider energy market, the thesis will need to be reconsidered.

Until then, the disagreement remains unresolved. The price looks bearish, but the physical evidence continues to point in the opposite direction.


DISCLAIMER: This article is based on a conversation from Top Traders Unplugged and reflects themes, ideas, and perspectives discussed during the episode. The views expressed are those of the guest and participants in the conversation and should not be interpreted as investment advice or as the official views of Top Traders Unplugged.

To receive future episodes, research, and weekly insights from the world of investing, macro, and trend following, sign up for our newsletter or subscribe on your preferred podcast platform.