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Why Populism and Inflation Keep Showing Up Together

Why Populism and Inflation Keep Showing Up Together

Every few decades, the same pattern usually turns up where government debt grows faster than the economy that has to carry it, and voters grow angrier at a system that no longer feels like it works for them. Then prices start behaving in ways that a single chart doesn’t explain. These are usually reported as three separate stories. They rarely are.

One macro strategist who spent years at the Federal Reserve before running a research shop put it this way: the biggest driver of inflation is not the shock itself, it’s what people expect to happen next.

A war, a bad harvest, a spike in oil prices, these things push prices up for a season. But if people still believe the central bank will bring things back to normal, they behave accordingly, and prices settle. The trouble typically starts once expectations come loose from that anchor. When people stop believing prices will come back down, they change their behavior in ways that make the belief come true.

That idea that inflation is mostly a story people tell themselves is the thread running through almost everything worth understanding about debt, politics, and the next decade of markets. Each section below traces back to some version of this mechanism.

The Three Doors Out of a Debt Spiral

There are only three ways a heavily indebted government gets out of its hole. It can default. It can inflate the debt away. Or it can close the gap between what it spends and what it collects, known as the primary deficit.

Fifty years of research across dozens of countries points toward the same conclusion: the fastest and least painful path is the third one, a sharp, short period of spending cuts.

Argentina took this route recently, absorbing a brief, painful contraction and coming out the other side with its books in order. Italy did something similar under Giorgia Meloni, cutting spending by more than three percentage points of GDP in a year and then outgrowing most of its neighbors. The empirical case for austerity is stronger than many people assume.

One counterargument is that a country with a reserve currency doesn't play by the same rules. The United States can, in theory, lean on what economists have long called its exorbitant privilege, the ability to borrow in its own currency from lenders all over the world. Whether that privilege can survive a serious attempt to inflate away the debt is the disagreement, and it’s worth watching closely, because the answer decides which of the three doors gets used.

The Fed's Gas and Brakes Problem

Central banks rarely announce their intentions outright. Instead, they signal.

A well-timed op ed, a speech at Jackson Hole, a public nod toward fiscal discipline, these are ways of managing expectations without committing to a specific policy path. One useful way to think about this moment is as a coordinated act between two roles: one person pushing for looser policy to keep markets calm and borrowing costs low, and another periodically playing the responsible adult, warning about the dangers of printing money.

Neither role is necessarily insincere, but treating the rhetoric and the policy as the same thing is a mistake. Watch what a central bank does with its balance sheet, not what it says at a podium. The gap between the two can tell you more about where the debt path is heading than any speech does, and that gap is where most of the money gets made or lost.

What Populism Is Asking For

Populism gets treated as one phenomenon, usually defined by its economic program. That framing misses the point, though.

At its root, populism is a demand to be represented. It shows up on the left as calls for more spending on health care and education, and it shows up on the right as calls for less spending and less redistribution. The programs look opposite. The underlying grievance is the same: a feeling that elected representatives stopped listening.

Consider immigration. Polling in the United States has shown a majority favoring less immigration going back to the 1970s, through administrations of both parties, while the policy outcome moved the opposite direction for decades. That gap between what voters wanted and what they got predicts populist energy better than any inequality statistic does.

A Small Country's Unglamorous Fix

Switzerland offers a useful, if unglamorous, case study. Its mix of representative democracy and direct democracy, where citizens vote directly on major policy questions through referenda, produces better outcomes on infrastructure, spending discipline, and public satisfaction than either system alone.

The mechanism is simple. Elected officials, left on their own, tend to drift toward serving themselves and their donors, and a referendum acts as a check, a way for the public to pull the system back when it wanders too far from what people want.

It’s not a flawless model, and pure direct democracy has its failure modes, but the blend, some representation, some direct input, shows up again and again in the data as a stabilizer against the disenfranchisement that feeds populist anger.

The 1970s, Read as One Story Instead of Three

Many accounts of 1970s inflation list three separate causes: heavy government spending, the cost of the Vietnam War, and the OPEC oil shock. Treating these as unrelated events misses how they reinforced one another.

Populist pressure led to protectionism. Protectionism strained international relationships. Strained relationships made commodity supply chains more fragile and easier to weaponize. Each piece fed the next.

A modern parallel comes from an unlikely source: weather. A major El Nino event, the type that shifts rainfall patterns across the Pacific, doesn't reduce global food or energy output so much as redistribute it, favoring some regions and punishing others. In a world with open trade, that redistribution barely registers as an inflation story.

In a fragmented, protectionist world, it becomes one, because countries with a surplus are far more willing to hoard than to share. The same weather event produces very different economic outcomes depending on how connected or divided the world happens to be at the time.

Turning the Public Into Shareholders

The most interesting proposal on the table isn't a spending plan or a tax plan. It's the idea of making ordinary citizens direct owners of financial assets, through a sovereign wealth fund or a broadly distributed equity account. If a country's growth increasingly runs through capital markets rather than wages, then giving more people a stake in those markets becomes one of the few ways to address inequality without abandoning a market-based system.

Norway's fund, centered on oil revenue, gets cited as the model, and for good reason, since it has grown into one of the larger pools of capital on earth without requiring the country to change its economic system. A version of this idea, scaled to a much larger economy, would take a decade or more to reach real size, but the appeal cuts across the political spectrum for a simple reason. It doesn't ask anyone to give up the free market. It only asks who gets to own a piece of it.

Debt, inflation, and populism get reported as separate headlines, but they read more clearly as three faces of the same underlying pressure, one that has shown up before and will show up again, in different clothes, until something changes the incentives underneath it. Recognizing the pattern early is usually worth more than reacting to whichever piece of it happens to be making news that week.


DISCLAIMER: This article is based on a conversation from Top Traders Unplugged and reflects themes, ideas, and perspectives discussed during the episode. The views expressed are those of the guest and participants in the conversation and should not be interpreted as investment advice or as the official views of Top Traders Unplugged.

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